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Crime Control, Due Process, & Evidentiary Exclusion:
When Exceptions Become the Rule
Elizabeth H. Kaylor
CUNY John Jay College

__________________________________________________________________
This paper uses the dichotomy between Herbert Packer’s (1968) two models of
criminal justice advocacy—“crime control” and “due process”—as a rhetorical
paradigm for understanding policy debate about the exclusion of relevant evidence
at trial. Understanding the opposition between crime control and due process
advocates as a rhetorical controversy, in which commonly-used ideographs
camouflage dramatically different constructions of the concepts at stake, helps to
illuminate the way each side mobilizes public support for their narrative of doing.
While both the exclusionary rule (which prohibits the use of illegally-obtained
evidence in criminal cases) and the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine (which
expands this rule) have been partially dismantled, they have not been abolished,
and each remains a significant and productive locus of the debate over what values
should inform the criminal justice process.

__________________________________________________________________
Introduction
In a nation where political rhetoric resounds with promises to “get tough on crime,” those
calling for tougher measures often find themselves pitted against civil liberties advocates
in policy debates. This division is best understood through the application of a model of
criminal justice advocacy developed by Herbert Packer (1968). Packer distinguishes
between advocates of a “crime control” model for justice and those advocating a model
which calls instead for “due process.” Curiously, though Packer’s dichotomy functions as
a rhetorical paradigm for understanding the kinds of arguments found in criminal justice
debates, and though this paradigm is frequently discussed in the criminal justice field, it has
not been widely applied in communication analysis of criminal justice issues. This paper
attempts to show its utility as a vehicle for assessing arguments about the exclusionary
rule, which prohibits the use of illegallyobtained evidence in criminal cases, and the “fruit
of the poisonous tree” doctrine, which expands this rule.
The crime control and due process models represent two competing value systems which
may be encoded in the criminal process to varying degrees (Packer, 1968). They also
characterize two distinct worldviews which shape competing arguments in the criminal
justice realm. In this way, crime control and due process are ideological filters for
constructing narratives about the best way to do justice in this country. The debate
between advocates of crime control and advocates of due process can be understood
through an analysis of rhetorical controversy. The position of each faction rests on an
understanding of justice that is wholly inconsistent with the interests and definitions of the
opposing side. In policy debates, both groups rely on the use of ideographs in order to
justify their recommendations (McGee, 1980a). The ideal types embodied by the two
models serve as guideposts to compare perspectives on reallife issues, such as the
exclusionary rule and the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine. Developed in a climate of
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civil liberties concerns, these principles have been partially dismantled through a series of
crimecontroloriented rulings. Yet they have not been abolished, and in fact remain a
significant and productive locus of debate over the values that should inform the criminal
process.
The Doctrines
Packer (1968)’s influential dichotomy between crime control and due process values can
be applied to a vast array of criminal justice policy debates, from the necessity of
mandatory minimum sentencing laws to the appropriateness of educational programming
in prisons and jails. However, tension surfaces between these differing perspectives as
early as the evidence collection phase of a criminal investigation, which inevitably
becomes a central concern during the adversarial courtroom process. The United States
Constitution works in tandem with a precedentbased body of collected jurisprudence to
provide a blueprint for what evidence is acceptable for the prosecution to present at trial.
Two crucial judicial doctrines underpin all legal decisions regarding the inclusion and
exclusion of evidence in criminal cases: the exclusionary rule, and an extension of this rule
known as the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine.
The exclusionary rule and the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine are judicial principles
that stem from the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees “[t]he right of the
people…against unreasonable searches and seizures,” and the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment, which holds that “no person…[may] be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law” (U.S. Constitution). The exclusionary rule was
designed to prevent the prosecution from introducing evidence obtained in violation of a
defendant’s Constitutional rights (Teague, 1982). Boyd v. U.S. (1886) was the first
American judicial case to exclude evidence on grounds implicating the Fourth Amendment
(Schroeder, 1981). According to the Court, asking Boyd to produce personal invoices as
evidence violated his Fifth Amendment rights by compelling him to be a witness against
himself (Boyd v. U.S., 1886). The Court also held that the search and seizure of private
papers was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment (Boyd v. U.S., 1886).
Twentyeight years later came Weeks v. U.S. (1914), wherein the defendant’s private
correspondence was seized by police without a warrant. The Court stated that the
protection of the Fourth Amendment must be respected by those enforcing federal laws
(Weeks v. U.S., 1914). The Weeks decision was important because the Court relied
exclusively on the Fourth Amendment for its judgment, and emphasized not only the
nature of the evidence but the manner in which it was seized (Schroeder, 1981). In Amos
v. U.S. (1921), the Court extended the exclusionary rule beyond private papers.
Thereafter, the Court focused on the manner in which evidence was obtained rather than
the nature of the evidence (Schroeder, 1981).
By 1928, the Court held that it was constitutionally required to exclude most evidence
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment; however, this applied only to individuals
acting under federal authority (Schroeder, 1981). It was not until Mapp v. Ohio (1961)
that the Supreme Court explicitly ruled that the exclusionary rule also applied to the states’
prosecution of state crimes. When obscene literature was seized during an illegal search
of the defendant’s residence, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed her conviction for
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possessing lewd material on the basis that the Fourth Amendment did not forbid the
admission of evidence obtained by unreasonable search and seizure in state prosecutions
of state crimes (Mapp v. Ohio, 1961). The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the state
court’s decision, closing “the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by
official lawlessness” (Mapp v. Ohio, 1961).
Left open, however, was the question of whether or not evidence obtained indirectly from
a rights violation should also be excluded. The “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine,
declaring evidence inadmissible when the defendant can demonstrate a causal connection
between the evidence and a prior rights violation (Maguire, 1964), was first espoused in
1920 in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. U.S. The government admitted that it had erred in
illegally seizing company papers, but desired to use knowledge gained from those papers
to frame and evidence a new indictment against the company (Silverthorne Lumber Co.
v. U.S., 1920). However, the Court held that the Constitution prohibits not only the illegal
seizure of evidence, but also all evidence resulting from it (Bain & Kelly, 1977). The “fruit
of the poisonous tree” doctrine extended the exclusionary rule to all evidence discovered
because of a rights violation (Maguire, 1964). The exclusionary rule thus expanded over
time to include “virtually any kind of evidence” unlawfully obtained by government agents
(Teague, 1982, p. 635).
Due Process Support
The exclusionary rule and the “poisonous tree” doctrine are supported by advocates of the
due process model, which espouses high evidentiary standards and the primacy of
individual rights (Packer, 1966). By 1965, the Court had articulated a number of reasons
for evidentiary exclusion (Schroeder, 1981). These had two primary foci—the rights of
the individual against whom the illegally seized evidence would be admitted and the
societal interests promoted by evidentiary exclusion, specifically, the importance of
securing judicial integrity and deterring illegal police actions (Schroeder, 1981). These
concerns are representative of the liberal position of the 1953–1969 Supreme Court under
Chief Justice Warren, which exemplified due process values (Ball, 1978; Kamisar, 2003;
Thaman, 2010).
The justifications for a robust exclusionary rule emphasize the rights of the accused. For
due process advocates, the interests of society are served not by an efficient criminal
process, as with the crime control model, but by ensuring that the process does not
impinge upon the “dignity and autonomy of the individual” (Packer, 1966, p. 239).
Because the combination of stigma and loss of liberty that may result from the criminal
process is considered the ultimate deprivation that the government can impose, the
criminal process must be judicial and adversarial, forcing the prosecution to fight at every
stage to prove the legal guilt of the defendant (Packer, 1966). Due process values
therefore demand the creation and enforcement of laws which protect citizens from
improper searches and seizures, and from any advantages gained over them as a result
(Kaplan, 1974).
The due process world view is compelling in its evocation of values of freedom and
autonomy, values which are enshrined in the American imagination. In due process
rhetoric, freedom and autonomy are ideographs, or virtue words, defined by McGee
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(1980a) as “ordinary language term[s]…[which] represent…commitment to a particular
but equivocal and illdefined normative goal” (p. 15). Ideographs commonly appear in
political discourse as explanations or justifications intended to strengthen public support for
a particular political position or action (McGee, 1980a; Sandmann, 1996). Although
ideographs provide the illusion of specificity, their mutability between contexts furnishes
them with an essential ambiguity that is the root of their rhetorical power (McGee, 1980a).
Crime control supporters do not claim to devalue freedom or autonomy; rather, due to the
abstract and individualized nature of these concepts, they are able use the same
ideographs to appeal to a different subset of the community while implying normative
consensus.
Crime Control Criticism
The crime control position on the exclusionary rule was summarized in People v. DeFore
(1926), where Judge Cardozo famously asked “[s]hould the criminal go free because the
constable has blundered?” This same sentiment was articulated by Chief Justice Burger in
his dissenting opinion in Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents (1971).
Justice Burger argued that any potential benefits of the exclusionary rule did not outweigh
“the high price it exacts from society—the release of countless guilty criminals.” Burger’s
statement embodies the central concern of crime control advocates with regards to
evidentiary exclusion. This is a compelling argument, drawing upon fear and a sense of
injustice to provoke a strong emotional response.
The crime control model emphasizes truthseeking and administrative efficiency and
prioritizes factual guilt over legal guilt (Packer, 1968). From a crime control viewpoint,
allowing guilty persons to go free is the ultimate failing of the criminal process (Packer,
1968). The crime control model accepts errors as a consequence of efficiency insofar as
they do not interfere with the goal of repressing crime by allowing guilty persons to go
free or damaging the reputation of the justice system to the degree that the deterrent
effects of the law are diminished (Packer, 1968). Markman (1997) argues that the
exclusionary rule is responsible for “releasing the obviously guilty…permitting juries to be
misled…and…[the] tolerance of false testimony” (p. 431). These socalled “crummy
technicalities” have undermined the integrity of the criminal process such that the
government cannot preserve the people’s right to freedom from predators (Markman,
1997, p. 431). Crime control advocates believe that when criminals go unpunished, social
disorganization and loss of social freedom inevitably follow (Packer, 1968). From a crime
control perspective, the implied meaning of autonomy has nothing to do with protecting
individuals against the tyranny of the state; rather, freedom is equated with undiminished
safety for the lawabiding citizens of the community.
This directly opposes the view articulated in Mapp v. Ohio (1961) that “[t]he criminal
goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a
government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws.” These opposing
conceptions of freedom bear a striking resemblance to the alternative meanings of liberty
identified by McGee (1980b). To illustrate the multiplicity of meanings in an ideograph,
McGee (1980b) retells the anecdote of Antun Robecick, a Gary, Indiana steelworker who
emigrated to his native Yugoslavia after retiring. Perhaps unexpectedly, Robecick is
unable to judge which country has more freedom: Yugoslavia is a totalitarian regime
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controlled by a sole man, yet he felt safe to walk its streets alone at night (McGee, 1980b;
Sandmann, 1996). In contrast, Robecick had freedom of thought and speech in the United
States, but feared for his safety and felt like a prisoner in his own house (McGee, 1980b;
Sandmann, 1996). Having experienced firsthand both conditions, and understood both as
manifestations of his relative freedom, Robecick was the unique position of seeing the true
ambiguity of an ideograph. To those entrenched in a crime control or due process
worldview, however, only one meaning is visible.
Here, the rhetorical controversy over the meaning of justice—another ideograph central to
the debate between crime control and due process proponents—becomes especially clear.
McGee (1980a) emphasizes that, at any specific moment in history, all ideographs are
synchronically connected to each other like brain cells linked by synapses. Justice
therefore is informed by understandings of freedom and autonomy and vice versa. From
a due process standpoint, violations of the procedural integrity of the criminal process
inflict greater harm on society than “lost” convictions (Packer, 1968). This is evident in
the privileging of legal, procedurallydetermined guilt over factual guilt (Packer, 1968).
Opposing Markman (1997), Thaman (2010) argues that the security of the populace is
most threatened when law enforcement agents are able to achieve convictions even when
they violate citizens’ rights in the process. It is not the criminal going free that threatens
social disorder and injustice, but the government overstepping its bounds (Packer, 1968).
Thus, it is not a “terrible cost” when criminal convictions are forfeited due to constitutional
violations (Thaman, 2010, p. 384). Due process advocates emphasize the victimless nature
of many of the crimes in cases where convictions are “lost” due to evidentiary exclusion,
usually involving the suppression of drugs or other “harmless” evidence (e.g. Kamisar,
2003; Kaplan, 1974; Schroeder, 1981; Thaman, 2010). Conversely, crime control
advocates condemn evidentiary exclusion for allowing killers, rapists, and other violent
criminals to unjustly go free (e.g. Brown, 1982; Markman, 1997; Kaplan, 1974; Wilkey,
1979).
From a crime control perspective, the criminal process should be principally concerned
with factual guilt (Packer, 1968). Supporters of a crime control model see the
exclusionary rule as a distortion of the truth insofar as it suppresses “undeniable facts” by
excluding material evidence that indicates factual guilt on the part of the defendant
(Markman, 1977; Schroeder, 1981; Wilkey, 1979, p. 222). Crime control advocates may
support the exclusion of evidence of questionable reliability, such as coerced confessions
(Wilkey, 1979), because these errors jeopardize the reputation of the criminal process and
damage its deterrent effects (Packer, 1968). However, they are resolutely opposed to
most cases of evidentiary exclusion, arguing that the rules are unnecessary for the truly
innocent and only protect guilty persons (Markman, 1997; Wilkey, 1979).
The Exceptions to the Rule(s)
Following the Warren Court’s establishment of a robust exclusionary rule, the Supreme
Court has limited its use via an increasing number of exceptions (Kamisar, 2003; Mertens
& Wasserstrom, 1981). This erosion reflects the adoption of crime control values by the
Court. The due process counterargument is illustrated by Justice Brennan’s dissent in
U.S. v. Havens (1980), where the Court ruled that the impeachment of the defendant
using illegallyseized evidence did not violate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights
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(Teague, 1982). Decrying this new exception to the exclusionary rule, Brennan asserted
that “what is important is that the Constitution does not countenance police misbehavior,
even in the pursuit of truth” (U.S. v. Havens, 1980). However, in keeping with calls for
convictions based on truth, or factual guilt (e.g. Markman, 1997; Wiley 1979), the Court
began prioritizing the efficient functioning of the criminal process above civil liberties
concerns.
The Supreme Court’s adoption of a “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule stands
as one of the most significant retreats from the exclusionary rule as originally established.
Since 1974, members of the Court advocated the adoption of an exception mandating that
evidence would not be excluded on the basis of rights violations in cases where law
enforcement agents acted under a reasonable, goodfaith belief that their actions were
constitutional (Ball, 1978). In Fourth Amendment cases, most good faith violations involve
failure to meet probable cause requirements (Ball, 1978). An officer may make a “good
faith mistake,” believing that the facts constitute probable cause, or commit a “technical
violation” by relying upon a statute, warrant, or precedent which is later invalidated (Ball,
1978, p. 635).
U.S. v. Williams (1980), wherein the United States Court of Appeals adopted a good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule, represents what Justice Brennan termed its “slow
strangulation” (Brown, 1982, p. 660). The court ruled that when the exclusion of evidence
is sought because police misconduct led to its discovery, the evidence should still be
admitted when the conduct, even “if mistaken or unauthorized, was yet taken in a
reasonable, goodfaith belief that it was proper” (U.S. v. Williams, 1980). The court
justified this exception on the basis that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter
police misconduct; thus, excluding evidence when the police acted rightly is unnecessary
(Brown, 1982; Mertens & Wasserstrom, 1981).
The Supreme Court applied the good faith exception four years later in U.S. v. Leon et
al. (1984), where it held that evidence seized in reasonable, goodfaith reliance on a
search warrant which was subsequently invalidated should not be barred from admission.
Subsequent decisions were premised on the understanding that Leon supported a
categorical exception to the exclusionary rule for police misconduct contingent on clerical
errors (e.g. Arizona v. Isaacs, 1995).
Herring v. U.S. (2009) may be said to represent a “sea change” in exclusionary rule
jurisprudence, as it was the first case to take the mental state of the police into account
(Posner, 2009). By holding that an officer’s actions must exceed mere negligence,
Herring paved the way for further expansion of the good faith exception (Herring v.
U.S., 2009). In Davis v. U.S. (2011), the Court again ruled that the reasonable, goodfaith
actions of law enforcement precluded the exclusion of evidence. The Court further stated
that the exclusionary rule applies only when “police exhibit deliberate, reckless, or grossly
negligent” disregard for the Fourth Amendment (Davis v. U.S., 2011). Justices Breyer
and Ginsburg dissented, arguing that the good faith exception would soon swallow the
exclusionary rule entirely (Davis v. U.S., 2011). This may not be an unwelcome
development for the Court, however, which has long exercised its discretion in serious
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cases to stretch legal doctrine and hold dubious searches and seizures legal (Kaplan,
1974).
The Court carved out a number of similar exceptions for the “fruit of the poisonous tree”
doctrine. In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States (1920), the Court stated that
illegallyobtained facts could still be admitted if knowledge of them was garnered from an
independent source. The burden of proof lies with the prosecution, who must convince the
court that the evidence is independent of the unlawful act (Maguire, 1964). In Nardone v.
U.S. (1939), the Court established a second exception, that of attenuation (Bain & Kelly,
1977). According to the majority, the prosecution may argue that the connection between
the initial violation and the derived evidence has become “so attenuated as to dissipate the
taint” of illegality (Nardone v. U.S., 1939). In Wong Sun v. U.S. (1961), the Court
restated the attenuation exception, but their language has been used to support another
exception, which applies where the government “undoubtedly would have (probably would
have) (could have) (might have) lawfully discovered the ‘tainted’ evidence” through legal
means (Kamisar, LaFave, & Israe, 1974, qtd. in Bain & Kelly, 1977, p. 625). This
“independent discovery” exception is the most nebulous and controversial of the
“poisonous tree” exceptions (Bain & Kelly, 1977).
Crime Control Support
Crime control proponents support these exceptions; even those who argue for the
complete abolition of the exclusionary rule believe that caveats, particularly the good faith
exception, mitigate its worst qualities (Markman, 1997). One criticism of the exclusionary
rule prior to U.S. v. Williams (1980) was that it failed to discriminate between “grossly
willful” police misconduct and errors made under the best possible judgment (Wilkey,
1979, p. 226). The good faith exception prevents the most egregious cases of criminals
going free due to minor violations (Brown, 1982) and increases the efficiency of the
criminal process in a manner consistent with crime control goals by protecting the use of
probative evidence in judicial factfinding (Ball, 1978). The exceptions of independence,
attenuation, and inevitability that mitigate the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine similarly
boost judicial discretion and make it less likely that evidence will be excluded.
Nonetheless, many crime control advocates view the exclusionary rule and “poisonous
tree” doctrine as fundamentally detrimental to the criminal process. Like other procedural
requirements associated with due process, the mandatory exclusion of evidence “fosters
perjury, consumes valuable judicial resources, and contributes to court delays” (Schroeder,
1981, p. 1383), hampering crime control premiums on speed and finality (Packer, 1968).
These hurdles allow innocent defendants to languish in jail and dangerous individuals
pending trial to remain free (Schroeder, 1981). This contravenes the crime control
objective of quickly screening out the innocent and rapidly securing the convictions of the
guilty, which ultimately contravenes the primary goal of justice as conceptualized by
crime control supporters (Packer, 1968). The exclusionary rule distracts from the crucial
question of guilt versus innocence (Schroeder, 1981), generating political hostility by
flaunting the costs of Fourth Amendment rights in terms of crime control (Kaplan, 1974).
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Due Process Concerns
From a due process perspective, however, the diminishing strength of the exclusionary
rule and its “poisonous tree” extension is a cause for concern. Kamisar (2003) suggests
that “nowadays the criminal only ‘goes free’ if…the constable has blundered badly” (p.
133). Indeed, the blunder must now demonstrate “deliberate, reckless, or grossly
negligent” disregard for the Fourth Amendment (Davis v. U.S., 2011). Limiting the
exclusionary rule to bad faith violations might encourage police to engage in unlawful
conduct with the belief that the courts will forgive all but the most egregious behavior
(Kaplan, 1974; Schroeder, 1981). Likewise, the gradual undermining of the “poisonous
tree” doctrine, achieved by balancing the seriousness of the unlawful act with the
connection between the act and the derivative evidence (Thaman, 2010), has increased
opportunities for the prosecution to convict based on rightsviolating evidence. Because
the stigma and deprivation of liberty that result from criminal convictions are so severe,
due process advocates argue that this represents a greater risk to public security, or
autonomy, than “lost” convictions (Packer, 1968; Thaman, 2010). Thaman (2010) asserts
that each time a (nonviolent) defendant escapes the “Draconian punishment” of the U.S.
through a successful suppression motion, it is “a plus for humanity and human rights” (p.
384). Like the crime control argument that evidentiary exclusion will improperly excuse
guilty persons, this rhetoric draws upon Americans’ desire for justice in criminal
procedure, positing instead that U.S. criminal sanctions are so unduly harsh as to make
“failure” preferable to conviction in cases of unconstitutional prosecution.
Conclusion
Ultimately, the exclusionary rule and the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine are hallmarks
of the dueprocessoriented Warren Court. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have
focused more on expeditious crime control, dismantling these exclusionary rules through
proliferating exceptions. However, despite calls for their abolition, the principles have not
been weakened to the point of disintegration. In fact, evidentiary exclusion remains a
fruitful catalyst for important debates over what values should inform criminal justice
policy. As Packer (1968) emphasized, crime control and civil liberties protection are not
mutually exclusive; both goals coexist in the contemporary criminal process as they did in
the heyday of the Warren Court. Examining old tensions and exploring new areas of
dispute are crucial for understanding and improving the criminal process and ensuring the
security of society at large. Packer’s two models provide the foundation for the
arguments presented in debates between advocates for broader law enforcement powers
and those demanding greater protection of human rights against state encroachment.
Understanding the opposition between crime control and due process advocates as a
rhetorical controversy, in which commonlyused ideographs camouflage dramatically
different constructions of the concepts at stake, helps to illuminate the way each side
mobilizes public support for their narrative of doing justice.
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